NOTES
ANTITRUST LAw-PUBLIC UTILITIES-POWER COMPANY'S "REFUSAL TO
DEAL" WITH FORMER MUNICIPAL CUSTOMERS FOUND TO VIOLATE

AcT-United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 410 U.S.
366 (1973).
Otter Tail Power Company is a small investor-owned utility which
SHERMAN

operates in parts of Minnesota, North and South Dakota and provides

electricity at the retail level to 465 towns in its service area.' Four
municipalities served by Otter Tail attempted to set up communityowned electric systems; 2 their intent was to buy power at wholesale
rates from either Otter Tail or from other suppliers and transmit it over
Otter Tail's lines.3 The establishment of municipal electric systems
would enable them to utilize lower cost power alternatives, i.e., whole4
sale power or power transferred ("wheeled") from other sources.
In an effort to preserve its retail markets, Otter Tail refused to sell
power at wholesale rates,5 refused to wheel power over its facilities,6 and

I United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54, 57 (D. Minn. 1971), aff'd in
part, remanded in part, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). The electric utility industry operates at three
levels to supply power to consumers: generation of electric power, transmission of energy
at high voltage, and distribution to the final customer. Meeks, Concentration in the
Electric Power Industry: The Impact of Antitrust Policy, 72 COLum. L. REV. 64, 67 (1972).
Otter Tail operated on all three levels, but most of the power sold to its retail customers
was purchased from other companies and transmitted and distributed over its power lines.
Otter Tail had set up its retail distribution system by virtue of non-exclusive statutory
franchises granted to it by the municipalities in its service area. 331 F. Supp. at 57. See
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 300.03-.04 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 49-03-01 to -02 (Supp. 1973);
S.D. CoMPImL
LAws ANN. §§ 9-35-1 to -3 (1967).
2 The towns of Elbow Lake, Minnesota, Hankinson, North Dakota and Colman and
Aurora, South Dakota did not renew Otter Tail's franchises when they expired, preferring
instead to set up their own distribution systems. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,
410 U.S. 366, 371 (1973).
3 Id. In the towns of Elbow Lake and Hankinson, Otter Tail was the only utility
operating transmission facilities. Id. Elbow Lake had offered to purchase Otter Tail's
distribution lines in that town when Otter Tail's franchise expired, but Otter Tail refused,
preferring to remove them. Elbow Lake then built its own generating plant and sought
standby power from Otter Tail. Village of Elbow Lake v. Otter Tail Power Co., 46 F.P.C.
675, 676 (1971). The Federal Power Commission (FPC) subsequently ordered a temporary
interconnection to furnish standby power. Village of Elbow Lake v. Otter Tail Power Co.,
40 F.P.C. 1262, 1272 (1968), aff'd sub nom. Otter Tail Power Co. v. FPC, 429 F.2d 232 (8th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 947 (1971). After further hearings on the issues previously
raised, the FPC ordered a permanent interconnection between the utility and the town.
410 U.S. at 371. Colman and Aurora, South Dakota, also established municipal systems,
but Otter Tail refused to sell at wholesale rates or to wheel power to them. However,
these towns had access to other transmission lines. Id.
4 Cf. 410 U.S. at 371.
5 Id. Otter Tail had established a company policy of not providing wholesale power.
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initiated litigation against its customers to prevent them from establishing their own systems.7 Further, it attempted to prevent the Bureau of
Reclamation from supplying power to the towns by invoking government transmission contracts which provided that Otter Tail could refuse to wheel power to those customers it had formerly served at retail.8
Consequently, the United States Government brought an action against
Otter Tail to enjoin violations of section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act,9 charging the company with monopolization of the sale and distribution of power. 10
The district court found that Otter Tail had violated section 2
by attempting to maintain a monopoly position through its refusal to
wheel or to deal." Otter Tail attempted to justify these refusals on the
basis that if forced to wheel or sell at wholesale, its business would
erode and lead to the demise of the company, since most of its customers would convert to municipally owned systems which would
use either wholesale or wheeled power.12 The court noted that Otter
40 F.P.C. at 1264. Electric utilities generally have not been "required to sell at wholesale
rates unless they have 'held themselves out' to do so." Hale & Hale, Competition or Control
V: Production and Distribution of Electric Energy, 110 U. PA. L. Rzv. 57, 64 (1961).
However, the FPC, in ordering a temporary interconnection between Otter Tail and Elbow
Lake, found such a company policy to be inconsistent with the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 824a(b) (1970). 40 F.P.C. at 1270.
6 331 F. Supp. at 60-61. Otter Tail was already wheeling power to 18 municipal customers which it had not previously served at retail when the suit was started. Id. at 58.
7 Id. at 61-62.
Otter Tail either instituted or sponsored and financially supported court litigation
which had the effect of frustrating the sale of revenue bonds to finance the
municipal systems. A "no-litigation certificate," reflecting the absence of litigation
which might impair the salability of revenue bonds, is essential to a successful
sale of municipal bonds. The pendency of litigation has the effect of preventing
the marketing of the necessary bonds thus preventing the establishment of a municipal system.
ld. at 62.
8 Id. at 59. Otter Tail had entered into contracts to provide wheeling services for the
Bureau of Reclamation of the Department of the Interior and for several regional power
cooperatives. The Bureau handles the marketing of power generated by federally sponsored hydroelectric facilities in Montana, North Dakota and South Dakota.
9 This action may be brought under section 4 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15
U.S.C. § 4 (1970).
10 331 F. Supp. at 56. Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970),
reads in pertinent part:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States . . . shall be deemed guilty of a
misdeameanor [sic] ....
11 331 F. Supp. at 61.
12

Id. at 64.
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Tail's franchises were non-exclusive and that the company was not
thereby protected from competition from municipal ultilies. 13
The sponsoring of litigation also was held to be violative of section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act since its effect was to hinder and
delay the establishment of municipal electric systems.' 4 Otter Tail had
contended that the use of litigation was within the reach of the rule set
out in Eastern RailroadPresidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc.,' 5 where antitrust immunity was granted to certain lobbying activities aimed at influencing governmental action.' 6 However, the court
held that Noerr applied only to efforts directed toward the legislative
7
and executive branches and did not extend to judicial proceedings.'
The court further stated that Otter Tail's restrictive transmission
contracts were in fact territorial allocation schemes and constituted
"per se" violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 18 Otter Tail had
argued that since the contracts in question were approved by government agencies (the Bureau of Reclamation was a party to one contract
and the Rural Electrification Administration (REA) had approved Otter
Tail's contracts with certain cooperatives), these agreements were immune to antitrust attack 19 in light of Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama
Electric Cooperative, Inc.

20

In Alabama Power it was held that the REA administrator had
acted within the scope of his statutory authority in granting loans to
a power cooperative which were conditioned on the security of 35-year
21
all-requirements contracts between the cooperative and its members.
Moreover, it was found that such proper discretionary action was immune from the antitrust laws and that the party with whom the ad22
ministrator dealt was likewise immune.
However, the district court found Alabama Power to be inapposite
and stated that there was no legislative provision conferring a similar
exemption from antitrust laws on the actions of either the Bureau
or the REA. 23 Therefore it granted injunctive relief prohibiting any
13 Id. at 57, 64. See Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 480 (1938); Rural Electrification Admin. v. Central La. Elec. Co., 354 F.2d 859, 864 (5th Cir. 1966).
14 331 F. Supp. at 62.
15 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
16 Id. at 139-40.
17 331 F. Supp. at 62.
18 Id. at 63. See notes 87 & 88 infra and accompanying text.
19 331 F. Supp. at 63.
20 394 F.2d 672 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1000 (1968).
21 See 394 F.2d at 675-76.
22 See Id. at 676-77.
23 331 F. Supp. at 63.

1973]

NO TES

future refusals to wheel, refusals to deal, or the sponsoring of litigation,
which conduct had been found to violate section 2.24
The contention raised on direct appeal 25 before the United States
Supreme Court in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States26 was that
refusals to deal within the utility industry were immunized from antitrust regulation by virtue of the authority to compel the interconnection of electric systems given to the Federal Power Commission (FPC)
under the Federal Power Act. 27 Collateral issues considered by the

Court concerned the validity of Otter Tail's refusals to wheel power,
the economic justification of refusals to wheel and to deal, and the
legality of using litigation to block potential competition. 2s
The United States Supreme Court first held that the Federal
Power Act did not confer immunity from section 2 prosecutions upon
Otter Tail's particular conduct and that these actions were in violation
of section 2.29 The Court then affirmed the district court's decree enjoining any future refusals to wheel or to deal, but vacated that part of
the order relating to the sponsored litigation and remanded it for
reconsideration by the lower court in light of more recently adopted
principles. 0
In deciding Otter Tail, the Supreme Court was called upon to
See id. at 65. The court enjoined Otter Tail
from any and all conduct, whether expressed in terms of contracts, policies, or
practices, having the effect of continuing the violations of the Sherman Act herein
found to exist.
However, the final decree issued by the district court was more explicit, enjoining
Otter Tail from
"[r]efusing to sell electric power at wholesale to existing or proposed municipal
electric power systems in cities and towns located in [its service area]" and from
refusing to wheel electric power over its transmission lines from other electric
power lines to such cities and towns.
410 U.S. at 375 (quoting from unreported district court decree).
25 The company took a direct appeal under section 2 of the Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 29 (1970), and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, 406 U.S. 944 (1972).
26 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
27 Id. at 373. The district court had not expressly ruled on the question of antitrust
immunity. Therefore the defendant contended that the trial court had erred because no
mention had been made of section 202(b) of the Federal Power Act. Brief for Appellant at
25, Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
28 410 U.S. at 378-81.
24

29 Id. at 374-75, 377.
So Id. at 379-80, 382. On remand, the district court found that Otter Tail's repetitive
use of litigation was violative of the Sherman Act. United States v. Otter Tail Power Co.,
360 F. Supp. 451, 451-52 (D. Minn. 1973).
For a discussion of the recently adopted principles concerning the use of administrative
or judicial processes to suppress competition by way of litigation, see notes 82 & 83 infra
and accompanying text.
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construe section 202(b) of the Federal Power Act3 1 to determine
whether it preempted antitrust regulation of refusals to deal. 32 Sher-

man Act immunity was not expressly granted in the Federal Power
Act,33 and in Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas,
Electric Light & Power Co.,84 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that
the grant of monopolistic privileges, subject to regulation by governmental body, does not carry an exemption, unless one be expressly granted, from the anti-trust
laws, or deprive the courts of
5
8
jurisdiction to enforce them.

Repeal of antitrust laws by implication has been judicially disfavored unless the court finds a "plain repugnancy between antitrust
and regulatory provisions.' '36 Such repugnancy may be shown where a
regulatory agency has been given the power to decide antitrust issues
and to enforce restrictions upon illegal conduct. 37 However, the Federal Power Act makes no general provision for FPC determination of
antitrust questions or for the imposition of penalties where violations
were discovered. 38 The Court thus found that the antitrust laws were
16 U.S.C. § 824a(b) (1970) states in pertinent part:
Whenever the Commission . . . finds such action necessary or appropriate in
the public interest it may by order direct a public utility (if the Commission finds
that no undue burden will be placed upon such public utility thereby) to establish
physical connection of its transmission facilities with the facilities of one or more
other persons engaged in the transmission or sale of electric energy, to sell energy
to or exchange energy with such persons ....
32 410 U.S. at 373.
31

83 For an example of an express exemption from antitrust laws, see, e.g., section 414
of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1970).
34 184 F.2d 552 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 906 (1950). In this case, an agreement
between two utilities which controlled pricing, expansion, territories and requirements
with other customers was found to be violative of the Sherman Act.
35 Id. at 560. See also Mervin, Antitrust Immunity of "Public Utilities" Regulated by
the FPC, 54 A.B.A.J. 687 (1968); Phillips, Increasing Conflict between Regulation and
Antitrust, 87 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 29 (1971). Contra, Hale & Hale, supra note 5, at 75.
36 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963). This principle has been espoused in cases dealing with other regulated industries. See, e.g., Silver
v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963) (securities exchanges); United States v.
Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 201 (1939) (agricultural cooperatives). Cf. Federal Maritime
Comm'n v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238, 241-43 (1968) (ocean carriers).
87 See United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474, 485-86 (1932).

38 Part II of the Federal Power Act provides for the regulation of interstate electric
utilities with respect to rates, mergers, issuance of securities, accounting, etc. However, the
FPC is not specifically authorized to act in regard to antitrust violations. See Kuykendall,
Antitrust Laws and Regulated Companies under the FPC, 65 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 373, 375
(1960).
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not incorporated in a "pervasive regulatory scheme" which would
prevent court proceedings.3 9
Nonetheless, judicial action may still be preempted where Congress
has manifested an intent to vest subject matter jurisdiction in the administrative body.40 The Court's review of the legislative history of the
Federal Power Act revealed that Congress had originally considered applying common carrier status to the utility industry, thus imposing a
41
duty to "transmit energy for any person upon reasonable request.
Furthermore, the proposed legislation would have given the FPC the
power to compel the wheeling of electricity if such action was found to
be "necessary or desirable in the public interest. '42 These provisions,
however, were ultimately rejected in order to preserve an atmosphere of
voluntary cooperation among utilities in integrating their facilities at
43
the transmission level.

The dissenting opinion in Otter Tail strongly contested the jurisdiction of the district court to hear the factual issues pertaining to
wheeling and the sale of wholesale power. 44 This view was based on an
interpretation that Congress intended to create a "zone of freedom"
whereby utilities could wheel or sell at wholesale at their discretion, but
45
within the framework of regulatory control over rates, service, etc.

89 410 U.S. at 374-75. See also United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334,
350 (1959).
40 See Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U.S. 411, 41920 (1965); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1963); Keogh
v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 162 (1922); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton
Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 440-41 (1907). For an example of specific congressional intent to vest
exclusive jurisdiction in a federal administrative agency, see section 221(a) of the Federal
Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 221(a) (1970).
41 410 U.S. at 374 (quoting from H.R. 5423, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 104 (1935); S. 1725,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935)).
42 410 U.S. at 374 (quoting from H.R. 5423, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 106 (1935); S. 1725,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935)). See also Comment, Public Utility Regulation: Wheeling and
the Sherman Act, 1972 LAw & Soc. ORDER 507, 508-09.
43 410 U.S. at 374 (citing S. REP. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1935)). The Federal
Power Act was not intended to provide a comprehensive scheme of regulation over interconnections and wheeling. The Senate Committee described their intent as follows:
While imposition of these duties may ultimately be found to be desirable, the
committee does not think that they should be included in this first exercise of
Federal power over electric companies. It relies upon the provision for the voluntary coordination of electric facilities in regional districts contained in the new
section 202 (a) (formerly sec. 203 (a)) for the first Federal effort in this direction.
S. RE'. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1935). See also H.R. REP. No. 1318, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 27 (1935).
44 410 U.S. at 391-92 (Stewart, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
45 Id. at 386-87. The dissent turned the legislative history of the Federal Power Act
into a two-edged sword. The lack of congressional interest in common carrier status was
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However, absent an express statutory provision, the judicial policy
against the presumption of antitrust immunity would invalidate the
"zone of freedom" theory espoused by the dissenters. 46
While wheeling was not brought under regulatory control, 47 in section 202(b) Congress did grant explicit statutory authority to the FPC
to compel the interconnection of systems. 48 Nevertheless, the Court
found this provision to be insufficient to oust its jurisdiction since a
decision by the FPC, while considering relevant anti-competitive factors, 49 does not bind a court in determining if Sherman Act antitrust

violations are present. ° Therefore the Court concluded section 2 could
be applied. 51
Since the antitrust laws are now to be applicable to utility industry
construed as an indication that certain discretionary powers should remain in the individual
utilities and that they would voluntarily develop into large economical operations. See id.
at 383-86.
46 Id. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
47 410 U.S. at 375. Initial attempts to introduce compulsory wheeling in the Federal
Power Act were unsuccessful. See note 43 supra. However, a felt need for such regulation
prompted further legislative proposals. See S. 2324, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 103(c)(1)(B)
(1971); H.R. 9970, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 103(c)(1)(B) (1971); S. 1071, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 3 (1969). These bills were also defeated. 410 US. at 386 n.4.
48 See note 31 supra.
49 410 U.S. at 373. Prior cases have established that the FPC shall consider the antitrust implications of activities which it approves pursuant to its statutory authority. See
California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 487-88 (1962); Atlantic Seaboard Corp. v. FPC, 404 F.2d
1268, 1272 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953, 958 (D.C.
Cir. 1968).
50 See 410 U.S. at 372, 374-75. The role of the Sherman Act was discussed in Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958):
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will
yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an
environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social
institutions.
Id. at 4.
51 410 U.S. at 374-75. Public utilities have generally been regarded as natural monopolies and ill-suited to the application of antitrust principles. Meeks, supra note 1, at 65.
A natural monopoly may be defined as a
monopoly resulting from economies of scale, a relationship between the size of the
market and the size of the most efficient firm such that one firm of efficient size
can produce all or more than the market can take at a remunerative price, and
can continually expand its capacity at less cost than that of a new firm entering
the business. In this situation, competition may exist for a time but only until
bankruptcy or merger leaves the field to one firm; in a meaningful sense, competition here is self-destructive.
C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 191 (1959). See also Posner, Natural Monopoly
and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 548 (1969); Note, Federal Regulation of Natural
Monopolies Under the Sherman Act, 14 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 635 (1963).
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refusals to deal, a jurisdictional conflict could emerge if the court enjoined future refusals to deal when Sherman Act violations were found
to exist (thereby necessitating interconnection) and the FPC denied
interconnection as not being necessary or appropriate to the public
interest under section 202(b). 5 2 Although the Court recognized this possibility, it left the question open for future resolution as that presented
a potential conflict which was not then before the court.6
While the final determination of which proceeding shall be conclusive yet remains, Otter Tail, by implication, reinforces recent decisions54 holding that administrative agencies must consider antitrust
policy in their determination of what actions may be in the public interest. This inference may be drawn from the Court's adoption, in
principle, of the power of the district court to compel interconnection
on its own order, albeit contingent upon FPC approval of the rates,
terms and conditions. 55 If any agency ruling is to be dispositive of the
issue of interconnection and thereby fully effectuate the goals of the
Federal Power Act, 56 it must clearly demonstrate that public interest
factors override any effects judged to be anti-competitive under Sher57
man Act standards.
410 U.S. at 376-77. See note 31 supra.
Id. An application for permanent interconnection was filed by the town of Elbow
Lake and was pending before the FPC at the time the suit was brought by the Government.
An order requiring long-term connection by Otter Tail was entered by the Commission
four days after the district court entered judgment. Id. at 392 n.8. The town of Hankinson,
against which Otter Tail's refusals to wheel and deal were also directed, renewed Otter
Tail's franchise. Id. at 376.
54 E.g., Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1968), where the
court stated that
it is clear that antitrust concepts are intimately involved in a determination of
what action is in the public interest, and therefore the Commission is obliged to
weigh antitrust policy.
Id. at 958 (see cases cited therein). See also California v. FPC, 369 US. 482, 487-88 (1962);
City of Pittsburgh v. FPC, 237 F.2d 741, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Note, Federal Power Commission Required To Give Presumptive Weight to Antitrust Policy, 1969 LAw & Soc.
ORDER 92, 98-99.
55 410 U.S. at 376-77. Although the judiciary's decision on the interconnection with
Elbow Lake had been in accord with the FPC order, the district court retained jurisdiction
to carry out its blanket injunction against future refusals to deal in violation of the
Sherman Act. Id. at 376.
56 One of the mandates of the Federal Power Commission was to assure
an abundant supply of electric energy throughout the United States with the
greatest possible economy and with regard to the proper utilization and conservation of natural resources ....
Federal Power Act § 202(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824a(a) (1970).
57 See Note, supra note 54, wherein it was stated that
[i]f a commission clearly considers antitrust policy in determining public interest,
the courts will be reluctant . . . to limit the application of such national policy.
Id. at 98.
52
53
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The dissent, having already adopted the interpretation that refusals
to wheel and to deal were allowable within the purview of the Federal
Power Act and therefore immune from antitrust provisions,58 propounded an alternative argument for abstaining from judicial action.
Since an FPC hearing concerning Elbow Lake's request for a compulsory interconnection was in progress at the time the antitrust suit was
brought, 59 Justice Stewart suggested that deferral to the agency proceeding would have been appropriate. 60 He supported this argument by
reiterating the criteria set out in Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange.," Although the facts were different, he argued for the applica62
tion of a similar rationale.
Ricci presented an unusual jurisdictional conflict since the conduct
challenged under the Sherman Act was also allegedly in violation of the
Commodity Exchange Act.6 3 The Court there upheld a stay of antitrust
proceedings to permit agency determination of whether violations of its
rules had actually occurred. 64 That decision was found to be of "material aid in ultimately deciding whether the Commodity Exchange Act
foreclose[d] this antitrust suit." 65 The question presented was not pre67
cisely one of primary jurisdiction,66 but was closely related.
58 410 Us. at 387.
59 See note 53 supra.
60 410 U.S. at 392.
61 409 U.S. 289 (1973). The criteria set forth in Ricci for a judicial deferral to
administrative proceedings in antitrust cases are:
(1) that it will be essential for the antitrust court to determine whether the
Commodity Exchange Act or any of its provisions are "incompatible with the maintenance of an antitrust action," . . . ; (2) that some facets of the dispute between
Ricci and the Exchange are within the statutory jurisdiction of the Commodity
Exchange Commission; and (3) that adjudication of that dispute by the Commission promises to be of material aid in resolving the immunity question.
Id. at 302 (quoting from Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 358 (1963)).
62 410 U.S. at 392-94. The essential element which brings Otter Tail within the scope
of Ricci is the existence of a regulatory control over utility company refusals to deal
which might supplant the application of antitrust principles. Id. at 392-93.
63 409 U.S. at 290-91.
64 Id. at 302.
65 Id. at 305.
66 Primary jurisdiction has been defined as applying
where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires a resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of
such issues to the administrative body for its views.
United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956). However, in antitrust cases
involving utilities, the question is not merely which body will make a factual determination, but rather how to apply antitrust principles, if at all, within the context of a
regulatory scheme. See Kestenbaum, Primary Jurisdictionto Decide Antitrust Jurisdiction:
A PracticalApproach to the Allocation of Functions, 55 GEo. L.J. 812, 814 (1967). See also
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The district court in Otter Tail did not discuss the possible advantages of deferring the court proceedings pending a final FPC determination. Although the FPG and the court ultimately reached identical
results on the issue of interconnection, 8 it would seem as though the
lower court improperly proceeded to consider the merits of the aspect
of the case pertaining to refusals to deal.6 9
Prior to Otter Tail, the question of the legality of utility company
refusals to wheel or to deal had not been raised.70 However, given the
judicial policy of limiting antitrust immunity as outlined above, it
7
would appear that the standards applied to competitive markets '
Petruccelli & Long, Antitrust and the Regulated Industries: The Role of the "Doctrine"
of Primary jurisdiction, 1969 U. ToLEwO L. REv. 303.
67 410 U.S. at 392; cf. Rieci v, Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. at 307.
08 410 U.S. at 376. The district court and the agency reached the same result on the
remedy for refusals to deal, but by different means. The court is authorized under 15
U.S.C. § 4 (1970) to grant broad injunctive relief against Sherman Act violations, while
the FPC has a limited grant of power:
The Commission shall have no authority to compel the enlargement of generating facilities for such purposes, nor to compel such public utility to sell or exchange energy when to do so would impair its ability to render adequate service
to its customers.
Federal Power Act § 202(b), 16 U.S.C. § 824a(b) (1970).
09 See 410 U.S. at 391-92 (Stewart, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The failure of the district court in Otter Tail
to discuss the attendant jurisdictional problems is puzzling, since the existing statutory
scheme manifested by section 202(b) afforded Elbow Lake the opportunity to remedy its
situation. Furthermore, if Elbow Lake had been denied relief by the Federal Power Commission, judicial review of the FPC decision could have been obtained. Part II, Federal
Power Act, § 313(b), 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b) provides that:
Any party to a proceeding under this chapter aggrieved by an order issued
by the Commission in such proceeding may obtain a review of such order in the
United States court of appeals . . . by filing in such court, within sixty days
after the order of the Commission upon the application for rehearing, a written
petition praying that the order of the Commission be modified or set aside in
whole or in part.
This review would normally include a determination of whether anticompetitive effects
had been properly weighed. See City of Lafayette v. SEC, 454 F.2d 941, 955 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Municipal Elec. Ass'n v. FPC, 414 F.2d 1206, 1209-10 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
70 The FPC had only recently decided that it lacked statutory authority to compel
wheeling. See City of Paris v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 41 F.P.C. 45 (1969). One commentator
has speculated that this lack of agency control prompted government action to apply
antitrust principles against utility company refusals to wheel. Comment, supra note 42, at
509.
71 In United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), the Court set the judicial
standard against which refusals to deal could be measured:
The purpose of the Sherman Act is . . . to preserve the right of freedom to
trade. In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act
does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an
entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to
parties with whom he will deal.
Id. at 307 (emphasis added). Thus a rule of reason test was applied to determine whether
individual refusals to deal would be illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
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should be extended to regulated monopolies. 72 Groundwork had already
been laid for this result in Packaged Programs, Inc. v. Westinghouse
Broadcasting Co. 73 and Six Twenty-Nine Productions, Inc. v. Rollins
Telecasting, Inc. 74 In each case the court held that a broadcasting

monopoly granted by the FCC did not protect a television station from
antitrust prosecution.7 5 The courts adopted the theory that the defendant's refusals to sell air time to customers who competed with them
in related activities could represent an abuse of monopoly power by
76
deterring competition-thus violating the Sherman Act.
§ 1 (1970), which prohibits restraints of trade. In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo
Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927), the Court stated that where no direct evidence was
available, a reasonable inference might be drawn that the defendant's conduct was in
furtherance of a monopoly. Id. at 375. Later cases demonstrate that an evaluation of the
factual context is necessary to determine whether a particular refusal to deal is unlawful.
See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953) (no specific
intent to violate antitrust laws found); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143,
154-55 (1951) (predatory business practices found); United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms,
Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32, 39 (D. Minn. 1945) (lawful refusals may not be used to achieve unlawful results). See generally Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws,
103 U. PA. L. REV. 847 (1955).
The same rule of reason should apply to individual refusals to wheel power. If such
activities deny competitors access to transmission facilities which are essential to the
conduct of their business, they should not be allowed under the Sherman Act unless a
reasonable basis is therefore demonstrated. See United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331
F. Supp. at 61, 64. This theory, as adopted by the district court, was set out in several cases
involving group efforts or conspiracies to eliminate competitors by restricting the use of
certain facilities to their members. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945);
United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912); Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit
& Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1952). See also A. NEALE, THE ANTITmuST LAws
OF THE UNrTED STATES OF AMERICA 68 (2d ed. 1970).
72 Cf. Meeks, supra note 1, at 75-76. The contrary position which has been expressed
is that although utility industry companies may possess monopoly power in their service
area, "it does not follow that such firms are thereby to be categorized as monopolists
for purposes of analyzing refusals to deal." Shenefield, Antitrust Policy within the Electric
Utility Industry, 16 ANTrrRugr BuLL. 681, 697 (1971). A public utility does not have the
authority to set its prices, but must apply to the FPC for approval of its rate structure. 16
U.S.C. § 824d(e) (1970). Furthermore, utility monopoly power is not achieved through the
exclusion of competition, but is granted subject to federal or state regulation. See 410 U.S.
at 389; Meeks, supra at 66 n.8.
78 255 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1958).
74 365 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1966).
75 255 F.2d at 709; 365 F.2d at 483.
78 255 F.2d at 710; 365 F.2d at 483. Since the activities over which monopoly power
was being exercised were outside of normal regulatory control, these cases were readily
adaptable to conventional section 2 treatment. See note 71 supra. Although Otter Tail's
actions were intended to preserve a position achieved through municipal franchises subject
to FPC regulation, competition could not be illegally precluded. Cf. Alabama Power Co.
v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 480 (1938); Rural Electrification Admin. v. Central La. Elec. Co.,
354 F.2d 859, 864 (5th Cir. 1966) (in both cases, private utilities with non-exclusive franchises attempted to prevent competition from municipal systems).
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Otter Tail's strategic dominance in the transmission of electricity
and its refusals to wheel or to sell at wholesale constituted a major de7
terrent to municipalities who sought to replace it at the retail level.

Thus, the district court found that Otter Tail's actions represented an
abuse of monopoly power similar to that identified in Packaged Programs and Six Twenty-Nine Productions7 8 Adopting this line of reasoning, the Supreme Court condemned Otter Tail's refusals to wheel or to
deal as demonstrating predatory proclivities79 which had the effect of
foreclosing potential competition and illegally extending its retail
monopoly position. s0
Although the Court affirmed the illegality of the defendant's refusals to wheel and to deal, Otter Tail's efforts to keep its municipal
customers from establishing their own distribution systems via litigation were not struck down.8 l Rather, the Court remanded this part of
the case for further consideration of the facts in light of California
Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 2 which held that the first
amendment did not confer immunity from Sherman Act prosecution
where the defendants were using administrative and judicial proceedings to resist highway carrier certification of potential competitors in
trucking operations.8

3

The Court imposed the same restrictions upon

7T For example, Hankinson, after having approved the establishment of a municipal
electric system, requested Otter Tail to sell wholesale power to it. When Otter Tail refused,
the town dropped this proposal and reinstated Otter Tail's franchise. 331 F. Supp. at 61.

Id.
See 410 U.S. at 381.
80 Id. at 377. Destruction of competition through the use of monopoly power was
struck down in United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948), where the defendant
theatre owners forced film distributors to grant them favorable clearances in towns where
they were faced with competition. This was done under threats of withholding their
purchase of films for the entire chain. Id. at 103-04.
The dissent in Otter Tail argued against the application of the same standards used
in competitive markets, since the municipalities, if successful, would merely replace Otter
Tail as the prevailing monopoly. 410 U.S. at 388-89. This theory fails to account for the
moderating influence that ready access to wholesale power would have upon Otter Tail's
monopoly position. See Meeks, supra note 1, at 79.
81 410 U.S. at 380.
82 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
83 Id. at 509, 514. The Court clearly found such activities to be beyond constitutional
protection:
It is well settled that First Amendment rights are not immunized from regulation when they are used as an integral part of conduct which violates a valid
statute.
Id. at 514. The rights of parties to attempt to influence legislative and executive bodies had
previously been established by the Court in Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), on the basis that such activities are an assertion
of the fundamental constitutional right to petition the Government and are essential to
the flow of information inherent in a representative form of government. Id. at 137-38,
California Motor Transport extended the so-called "Noerr doctrine" to encompass ad78
79
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these activities as were set out in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.8 4 In each case it was found that at-

tempts to influence governmental action are not protected when they
comprise a "mere sham" and are actually made only to suppress competition.8 5
The Court then considered the legality of Otter Tail's transmission contracts which the company claimed validated its refusals to
wheel.8 6 It found that the contracts constituted territorial allocation
schemes 7 and were per se violations of the Sherman Act.88 The Court

thereby extended the rule of per se illegality, which previously had been
primarily applied to section 1 Sherman Act cases, 9 to the section 2 vioministrative and judicial proceedings and to protect the first amendment rights of all
individuals to unite in furtherance of common interests. 404 U.S. at 510-11. Noerr also
held, and CaliforniaMotor Transport reaffirmed, that an intent to achieve anti-competitive
ends by such activities does not, by itself, prevent the exercise of such rights. 365 U.S. at
139-40; 404 U.S. at 515.
84 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
85 404 U.S. at 511; 365 U.S. at 144.
80 410 U.S. at 378-79.
87 Id. Territorial allocation schemes may be classified as either horizontal or vertical. A
horizontal restraint has been defined as "an agreement between competitors at the same
level of the market structure to allocate territories in order to minimize competition."
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972). Vertical restraints have
been defined as "combinations of persons at different levels of the market structure." Id.
The Court, in White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), stated that
"[hjorizontal territorial limitations . .. are naked restraints of trade with no purpose
except [the] stifling of competition," and that "vertical territorial limitation[s] may or may
not have that purpose or effect." Id. at 263. Although the Otter Tail Court did not expressly discuss this distinction, it did rely on classic horizontal territorial restraint language in finding that the contracts had the effect of denying a potential competitor
"access to the fenced-off market." 410 U.S. at 378 (quoting from Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 12 (1958)). For a general discussion of territorial market divisions,
see Note, Territorial and Customer Restrictions: A Trend Toward A Broader Rule of
Reason?, 40 Go. WASH. L REv. 123 (1971).
88 410 U.S. at 378-79. "Per se" standards evolved as a judicial effort to expedite antitrust proceedings because
there are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect
on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise
harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). For a general discussion of
"per se" standards as pertaining to territorial restrictions, see von Kalinowski, The Per Se
Doctrine-An Emerging Philosophy of Antitrust Law, 11 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 569 (1964); Van
Cise, The Future of Per Se in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 1165 (1964); Note, Rule of
Reason Applied to Division of Territories, 3 B.C. IND. & Com. L. Rxv. 107 (1961); Note,
Section 2 of the Sherman Act-Is a Per Se Test Feasible?, 50 IowA L. REv. 1196 (1965);
Comment, Horizontal TerritorialRestraints and the Per Se Rule, 28 WAsH. & LEE L Rav.
457 (1971).
89 See, e.g., United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608-09 (1972); United
States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 357-58 (1967); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951).
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lations in Otter Tail. Such agreements would have a pernicious effect on
competition at the wholesale level of utility industry operations and
would thus justify per se treatment. 90
On the issue of business justification as a defense to refusals to
deal, " ' the Court took a less stringent stand than it did in its resolution
of prior issues. Although asserting that '[t]he promotion of self-interest
alone does not invoke the rule of reason to immunize otherwise illegal
conduct,' "92 the Court did infer that some economic justification
could protect the defendant's refusals to deal in the presence of monopoly power.98 It suggested that the lower court in any subsequent proceeding should be sensitive to the impact of its decision upon the defendant's operations . 4 Since in this case the district court had retained
90 This position was taken in Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Williams Elec. Cooperative,
Inc., 263 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1959), where the court found that
the rule has been promulgated and consistently applied that contracts between
quasi-public corporations, having for their object the division of territory between
such companies, are against public policy, and being so, are absolutely void, untempered by any application of the "rule of reason."
Id. at 434. See United States v. Florida Power Corp., 1971 TRADE CAS.
73,637 at 90,655
(M.D. Fla. 1971) (consent decree). Contra, Shenefield, supra note 72, at 693-94.
91 Self-defense of a business interest was held not to be unlawful in Union Leader
Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582 (Ist Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 833 (1961), where the court of appeals explained that
a natural monopoly market does not of itself impose restrictions on one who
actively, but fairly, competes for it, any more than it does on one who passively
acquires it. In either event, there must be some affirmative showing of conduct
from which a wrongful intent can be inferred.
284 F.2d at 584 (footnote omitted).
92 410 U.S. at 380 (quoting United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 375
(1967)). Schwinn concerned the attempts of a bicycle manufacturer to improve his eroding
market position by restricting the sale of his product to franchised dealers only. The
franchising system was found to be subject to a rule of reason analysis, but the territorial
restrictions which it imposed were per se unlawful under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
388 U.S. at 381-82.
Otter Tail had asserted that its refusals to deal should be considered as protection
for its valid business interests, and therefore subject to a "rule of reason" analysis. See
331 F. Supp. at 58. Although the district court appeared to find Otter Tail's actions per se
illegal, its conclusion that Otter Tail's prophesies of financial disaster were unfounded
seems to indicate that the proffered business justifications were inadequate. Id. See Comment, supra note 42, at 512-13.
93 410 U.S. at 381.
94 Id. The Court recognized that the lower court's injunction could have severe adverse effects upon the defendant's operations. Id. The dissent characterized this treatment as
"cursory" in view of the Commission's opinion ordering interconnection with Elbow
Lake. Id. at 393. It quoted from the FPC decision, where the agency found that
[w]hile it is our responsibility to take all possible steps to insure to Elbow Lake's
customers a high standard of service reliability, our terms and conditions must
not invite improvident ventures elsewhere.
We also share the Examiner's view that Otter Tail is legitimately concerned
about the possible erosion of its system. If other communities were to follow
Elbow Lake's route, and if, having miscalculated the results, they could expect to
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jurisdiction to modify its decree and would subject the conditions for
future interconnections to FPC approval, the Supreme Court concluded
that no abuse of judicial discretion had occurred. 95
Otter Tail has left unanswered the important question of whether
the agency or the court will ultimately decide when compulsory interconnection of public utilities shall be required. The judicial review of
regulatory proceedings as provided in the Federal Power Act has been
temporarily replaced by a de novo consideration of company activities
in spite of the fact that regulatory provisions should preclude the harm
that the antitrust laws seek to prevent. 96 Unless this jurisdictional question is finally resolved in favor of the agency, further legislation may be
needed to reinforce the policies of the Federal Power Act and to prevent
sporadic court action which might be harmful to the operational flexibility required by the industry. 97 In addition, by extending antitrust

remedies to wheeling, the judiciary has undertaken a quasi-administrative role in regard to that phase of industry conduct, but without offering clear standards9 8 to guide utility companies or judges in future
decisions.
On the other hand, the result of the case can be defended on the
grounds that some benefits may be realized by the consumer as a result
of greater possibility for competition in the retail market from municipalities having ready access to wholesale power. However, the longbe rescued by overly-generous interconnection terms, then Otter Tail's fears that
it will lose its customers, seriatim, seem to us to be supported.
Village of Elbow Lake v. Otter Tail Power Co., 46 F.P.C. 675, 678 (1971) (quoted in 410
U.S. at 393-94 (Stewart, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)).
95 410 U.S. at 381-82. However, the dissent contended that the injunction usurped
the power granted to the FPC under section 202 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 824a(b) (1970), to decide whether interconnection should be compelled. 410 U.S. at 395.
96 Otter Tail did not suggest that the FPC's interconnection power was inadequate to
protect municipal utilities from refusals to deal by transmission companies, although that
conclusion would seem to be a prerequisite to a finding that individual monopoly power
had been abused. See Shenefield, supra note 72, at 698. However, the ability of the FPC
to protect the public interest has been questioned. See Note, Threat of Corporate Destruction Does Not Legitimize Exclusionary Conduct, 50 TEXAS L. REv. 1023, 1029 (1972).
97 410 U.S. at 391-92. Cf. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 350

(1959).
98 One commentator has proffered several factors to be considered in evaluating refusals to wheel under the Sherman Act, namely:
(1) The existence and extent of monopolistic power; (2) the offensiveness of the
conduct of the alleged monopolist; (3) the probability of obtaining industry
economies by the purchase of the wheeled power; (4) the effect of wheeling on
power and system reliability; and (5) the possibility that wheeling would require
substantial investment by the wheeler of power.
Comment, supra note 42, at 525.
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107

standing rejection of common carrier status and compulsory wheeling
indicates a lack of legislative approval of the displacement of investorowned systems by municipal utilities. The Court in Otter Tail has imposed free enterprise concepts on utility operations where they are not
clearly warranted and in spite of this congressional philosophy.
Edward A. Bertele

